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I. INTRODUCTION
Unlike most of the developed world, where investor-owned water
systems serve the majority of the population, the United States relies
mostly on water provided by public systems. To a great extent, these
systems were financed through the taxation authority of the federal
government—the iconic Hoover Dam only one of the many hundreds
of pipelines and reservoirs built by agencies such as the Bureau of
Reclamation and Army Corps of Engineers for the benefit of local
economic development. Similarly, many of the drinking and wastewater treatment facilities in operation today were built to help communities comply with the federal Safe Drinking Water Act and Clean
Water Act and financed in large part by federal dollars distributed
through the Environmental Protection Agency, sometimes leveraged
by state revolving loan funds. What of our public water systems has
not been paid for by federal or state tax dollars has been debt-financed through the tax-exempt municipal bond market. Of the $3.7
trillion municipal bond market,1 roughly 10% is debt issued by water
and wastewater systems to build, repair and expand water
infrastructure.2
† The Author is Senior Manager of the Water Program at Ceres, where she
works with water service providers to build business models that are resilient to
weather extremes, climate change and resource depletion. Her focus includes the role
municipal bond market participants play in driving sustainable water management
including infrastructure transformation of development of rate structures that enable
the transition to sustainable water systems. She was a fellow in the MIT-USGS Science Impact Collaborative at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where she
focused on the role of science in multi-stakeholder resource planning and dispute
resolution, and holds a BA in Physics and English from Washington University in St.
Louis and a Master in City Planning from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
1. William Selway, U.S. Municipal Bond Market Shrinks as States, Cities Cut
Debt, BLOOMBERG (June 7, 2012, 11:04 AM), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2012-06-07/u-s-municipal-bond-market-shrinks-as-states-cities-cut-debt.html.
2. See generally MUNICIPAL SEC. RULEMAKING BD., 2011 FACT BOOK, http://
www.msrb.org/msrb1/pdfs/MSRB2011FactBook.pdf.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.37419/JPL.V1.I1.4
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Water use has remained static over the last three decades,3 attributable to passive savings as our household, agricultural and industrial
technologies became more water efficient, and in some places by behavior changes such as movements away from lush lawns and toward
xeriscaping in desert communities. Yet population movements, infrastructure decay, over-allocated water resources and climate variability
and change are necessitating a new round of investments in capital
assets for water treatment, storage and delivery.
In the absence of significant federal subsidies, states and local governments will have to make room on their balance sheets to finance
the $300 billion4 to $1 trillion5 in projected capital needs over the next
thirty years, or incent private capital to participate in water projects.
Much of this projected need is simply to replace existing assets; cost of
securing new water supplies could easily double this need—the state
of Texas alone projects $53 billion in capital expenditures for new supplies by 2060.6 How local governments will pay for this investment in
critical infrastructure, and whether these capital expenditures will be
sufficient to secure reliable water supplies, is as important to waterintensive industrial and commercial entities as to households, as public water systems count industrial and commercial water users among
their customers.
To a great extent, corporations’ access to reliable and cost-effective
water supplies is in the hands of local entities. Yet as market awareness of water risks in corporate performance has risen, leading to a
proliferation of investor risk assessment tools including Ceres’ Aqua
Gauge, World Resources Institute’s Aqueduct and others, few equities investors or corporate risk managers have developed analytical
tools to assess risk down the supply chain. Fewer still have cultivated
engagement pathways beyond the corporation to manage risk in the
watersheds or aquifers feeding their operations or supply chain.
Water is a shared resource, one that cannot be adequately managed
without long-term planning, cooperation between providers and their
customers and even between users competing for the same resource.
At present, our tools for assessing water providers’ risks and the
reliability of their resources are inadequate to determine risk and re3. J.F. Kenny et al., USGS Circular 1344: Estimated use of water in the United
States in 2005, U.S. Geological Survey 2009, 43, http://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/1344/pdf/c
1344.pdf.
4. 2007 DRINKING WATER INFRASTRUCTURE NEEDS SURVEY AND ASSESSMENT,
FOURTH REPORT TO CONG. OF THE U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 816-R-09-001
(Mar. 2009), available at http://water.epa.gov/infrastructure/drinkingwater/dwns/in
dex.cfm.
5. See Burried No Longer: Confronting America’s Water Infrastructure Challenge, AM. WATER WORKS ASS’N 10 (Feb. 27, 2012), http://www.awwa.org/publica
tions/breakingnewsdetail.cfm?itemnumber=58522 (stating “AWWA Report finds infrastructure bill to top $1 trillion.”).
6. TEXAS WATER DEVELOPMENT BOARD, WATER FOR TEX. 2012 STATE WATER
PLAN 7 (2012).
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silience, as they fail to recognize the interconnectedness of water resources, the impending exhaustion of groundwater resources that have
served as insurance against drought, and the persistent deferment of
basic maintenance and asset replacement, among other factors. Even
worse, the market in its current state too often sends perverse signals
to water managers who are balancing long-term resource resilience
against short-term financial metrics. Credit ratings and cost of capital
are among the most compelling benchmarks against which water managers adjust their performance. For this reason, it is imperative that
the short-term outlook of markets and their focus on water systems’
operational characteristics, rather than resource fundamentals, be adjusted if water providers are to develop more resilient water management practices. This is an imperative not only for the security and
resilience of water resources, but also for sustainable returns for investors across a range of asset classes: those who lend to public water
systems through the bond market, those with equity positions in water
infrastructure projects, and even those with long positions in water
technology companies and investor-owned utilities.
Better disclosure is fundamental to identifying and managing the
shortcomings in our water management practices. Disclosure is necessary but insufficient—investors and financial intermediaries must adjust their own assessment methodologies to measure what matters,
and price accordingly.
II. MARKET STRUCTURE
In the United States, public utilities owned by municipal governments or political subdivisions supply the lion’s share of water to
households, commercial and industrial enterprises alike. Unlike other
developed countries, which tend to have a handful of large companies
providing water services, the domestic water sector is a highly decentralized market with tens of thousands of providers (the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) estimates more than 53,000 state and
municipal water utilities).7 These numbers are somewhat misleading:
while 56% of the systems out there serve 500 people or less, nearly
half of the U.S. population is served by 1% of public systems.8
The ability of water systems to raise financing for system replacement or expansion depends greatly on size. Though the majority of
the population is serviced by systems that are large enough to go directly to the capital markets, most of the tens of thousands of water
systems are too small to be creditworthy. As a result, they rely heavily
on state revolving funds (“SRF”) to finance upgrades. SRFs are a
limited resource, perhaps unnecessarily so: they are seeded by Con7. See generally 2006 Community Water System Survey, 1 EPA (2006), http://
water.epa.gov/infrastructure/drinkingwater/pws/upload/cwssreportvolumeI2006.pdf.
8. Id. at 28.
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gressional contributions to the EPA and matched with a required 20%
minimum contribution from the states, which stretch this resource to
varying degrees. Some states essentially grant the money in the form
of forgivable principal, 0% interest loans, while others leverage the
SRF funds by floating their own bonds to guaranty the debt of local
borrowers. While some estimates suggest that the $40 billion of net
assets behind the Clean Water State Revolving Fund alone could be
leveraged to fund $3 trillion worth of infrastructure improvements9
(far outstripping even the most inflated estimate of water infrastructure need), in practice the use of SRF funding has barely scratched the
surface of smaller systems’ capital needs.
With too little money to go around (or in some states, too much
money flowing in the form of subsidized loans to borrowers who could
otherwise reach the bond market directly), the result is persistent underfunding of smaller systems, poor water quality in rural areas, and
thousands of systems out of compliance with environmental regulations year after year. As regulatory non-compliance is often an indicator of system failure, we may expect a wave of forced capital
expenditures in the coming decades as delivery, treatment, and storage assets reach their failure point. This wave of capital needs may in
turn force consolidation in the sector, either through privatization by
the few investor-owned utilities operating in the United States, or acquisition by large public regional providers. Texas is one state that has
seen a recent spate of privatization of small systems by companies like
Aqua America, Inc. and SouthWest Water Company.
One percent of the total number of water systems in the United
States serve nearly half the population. These systems raise money
for their capital improvement programs through the financial markets,
predominantly through the sale of municipal bonds backed by revenue from water sales and sewage fees. The municipal market is highly
effective at delivering long-term, affordable capital to public water
systems—capital programs are often financed by bond series with
principal repayments of up to thirty to forty year maturity, helping
systems smooth the cost of large projects over several generations of
ratepayers.
Municipal bonds are often tax-exempt, making them appealing to
individual investors—often through mutual funds—and banks and insurance companies seeking tax-exempt yield at reasonably low risk.
Since 2003, water and wastewater systems have floated nearly $350
billion in bonds.10 Bond issuances by water and wastewater enterprises peaked in 2010, surfing on a wave of the federal stimulus program’s Build America Bonds, which infused nearly $45 billion in
9. Michael Curley, The Gold Mine, 29 ENVTL. F. 24 (2012).
10. Greg Swartz, Senior Vice President, & Piper Jaffray, Ariz. Pub. Fin. Office,
Panel Presentation at W. Governors’ Ass’n/ W. States Water Council: Drinking Water
& Wastewater Infrastructure Fin. (Nov. 15, 2012).
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bonds for water and wastewater systems. That investment dropped
precipitously in 2011 to $30 billion, and even further to $25 billion in
2012, well below the ten-year average for debt issuance.11
There are several reasons for the decline in bond-financed capital
improvement programs even in this environment of interest rates at
all-time lows and growing need for water infrastructure improvement
and development. One reason is that water systems are delaying infrastructure expenditures in the hopes of another flush of federal
spending through ARRA-like programs or the much-anticipated National Infrastructure Bank, which could be structured to leverage public funds to attract private capital. And for many systems, the
economic environment that has produced low borrowing rates is also
responsible for stagnant economic development, a constraint to the
upward rate adjustments that would be necessitated by increased
debt.
Alongside these reasons is a trend that has escaped recognition by
many water commentators and policy advocates: in recent years, per
capita demand for water has declined at unprecedented rates, slowing
demand even against the longer-term decadal trend of declining per
capita water use across the United States.12 This unexpected downturn in demand raises profound challenges for water providers, who
are simultaneously confronting supply-side pressures and a financial
model that streamlines supply projects but constrains demand management. Because the predominant business model in the drinking
water sector is one of volume-based sales, it is also a source of considerable risk for water systems and the investors who finance their infrastructure. And at the heart of water systems’ limits to financing is the
willingness and ability of their customers to pay for their services, a
problem that certainly extends to industrial and commercial customers but which rests, for the most part, on discovering sustainable revenue models for residential customers, which constitute the majority of
water systems’ revenues regardless of system size.13
There are no magical financing schemes waiting in the wings for
water systems, despite the wishes of policymakers and the boosterism
of some private market commentators. In recent years as the scale of
need for capital improvements has outpaced revenue gains in the
water sector, many have asked whether alternative financing models
like public-private partnerships (“PPP”), private equity or infrastructure funds could play more of a role in financing water infrastructure,
as such funding schemes do for transportation, airports, and other
sorts of critical infrastructure. There is no doubt that far more opportunity exists to leverage public funding to attract private capital for
11. Id.
12. See generally Thomas D. Rockaway et al., Residential Water Use Trends in
North America, 103:2 J. AWAA 76 (2011).
13. See 2006 Community Water System Survey, supra note 7.
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water, but the repayment of such schemes will almost always be borne
by ratepayers and taxpayers, just as they would be through public financing. A recent large scale water supply project in Southern California demonstrates this point: the Carlsbad Seawater Desalination
Plant is a joint venture of the San Diego County Water Authority
(“SDCWA”) and Poseidon Resources, a private entity which secured
equity from a third-party investor. The financing terms for this project, whose total price tag approaches one billion dollars, were secured
by a thirty-year water purchase agreement with SDCWA for 56,000
acre-feet a year at around $2,000 an acre-foot, a model not dramatically different from those that finance electric power generation facilities.14 The majority of the project was financed through tax-exempt
bonds issued by the California Pollution Control Financing Authority
on behalf of both SDCWA and Poseidon. Ultimately, while private
investors bear some degree of construction and contract risks, the project will be repaid by ratepayers of the San Diego County Water Authority and its contractor agencies.
In addition, the political hurdles to increasing private capital’s participation in water projects may be more obstinate in the United
States than in any other developed country, as Americans hold peculiarly strong views of the sanctity of not only water but also the conveyance, storage, and treatment systems through which it passes as a
kind of public good. In part this American ideology may reflect distrust in the ability of government to properly regulate private entities,
with water representing the most precious and fundamental of all
physical needs. Whatever the explanation for this cultural attitude toward private involvement in water infrastructure, the result is that the
PPP market in the United States remains a tiny fraction of total water
infrastructure spending—the average annual bond issuance by water
and wastewater systems over the last decade was more than $30 billion, while the total PPP market was around $2 billion.15
But whatever the financing structure for water projects, fundamental risks are affecting the sector in ways that should be considered by
water system managers, policymakers, and investors.
III. SUPPLY RISKS
Supply risks imperil the ability of human users to exercise the use of
water on which they depend for health or economic purposes. Supply
risk takes myriad forms, both physical and legal. For water systems,
these supply risks may translate into reduced revenue if water cannot
be diverted for sale; increased capital expenditures to secure addi14. Favorable Desalination Project Bond Sale Saves Ratepayers $200 Million, SAN
DIEGO COUNTY WATER AUTH. (Dec. 14, 2012), http://www.sdcwa.org/favorable-desal
ination-project-bond-sale-saves-ratepayers-200-million.
15. Interview with Laurent Auguste, President and CEO, Veolia Water North
America, at Ceres (Jan. 28, 2013).

\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWR\1a-1\TWR204.txt

2013]

unknown

Seq: 7

29-OCT-13

INVESTMENT RISKS FOR WATER PROJECTS

12:12

75

tional supplies; or treatment facilities that lower debt ratios or higher
operating costs that impair operating ratios.
It should be noted that corporate water users are also subject to
these supply risks, whether they buy directly from a water system,
hold water rights to surface resources, or manage their own supply
infrastructure such as groundwater wells or storage reservoirs.
Physical risk may take the form of:
• Over abstracted resources. Groundwater accounts for 20% of
water used in the U.S.16 and in areas of heavy usage and irregular precipitation is being rapidly depleted. Because groundwater
is often the cheapest source of supply and its use is virtually unregulated, groundwater supplies can be both the lowest cost and
the highest risk of supply options over the long-term. Because
water users with groundwater resources often increase the exploitation of those resources during droughts or when surface
supplies rise in cost, choices that seem financially prudent in the
short-term may come at the expense of long-term supply security. The city of Lubbock is one example where emergency
drought reinforcements came in the form of a well field drilled
into the Ogallala Aquifer17—the Panhandle groundwater source
on track to be depleted within a generation.18
• Imperiled resources. Groundwater supplies can also be imperiled
from manmade pollutants or intrusion of natural contaminants
that make water unfit for human consumption. Industrial waste
injected into aquifers imperils the use of groundwater supplies in
regions with unstable surface water supplies—in many cases, this
pollution of aquifers is legally permitted by state and federal
agencies, as in Texas, where more than fifty exemptions for disposal of industrial waste including uranium mining waste have
been issued for aquifer injection, the most recent in September
2012.19

In low-lying coastal areas like Florida and Cape Cod, saline intrusion into aquifers is rapidly escalating costs of groundwater treatment.
Sea level rise is also necessitating significant expenditures to replace
16. J.F. Kenny et al., USGS Circular 1344: Estimated use of water in the United
States in 2005, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY 2009, 43 (2009), http://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/
1344/pdf/c1344.pdf.
17. Adam D. Young, Drought taxing area lakes, Water Advisory Commission to
discuss strategic supply plan, LUBBOCK AVALANCHE J. (Aug. 15, 2012), available at
http://lubbockonline.com/local-news/2012-08-15/drought-taxing-area-lakes-water-advisory-commission-discussstrategic-supply#.UGzJk_k-uvU.
18. Groundwater Depletion in Semiarid Regions of Texas and California Threatens
U.S. Food Security, U. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN, NEWSWISE (May 24, 2012, 12:45 PM),
available at http://www.newswise.com/articles/groundwater-depletion-in-semiarid-regions-of-texas-and-california-threatens-u-s-food-security.
19. Abrahm Lustgarten, Poisoning the Well: How the Feds Let Industry Pollute the
Nation’s Underground Water Supply, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 11, 2012, 12:01 AM), http://
www.propublica.org/article/poisoning-the-well-how-the-feds-let-industry-pollute-thenations-undergroun.
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stormwater and sewage systems overwhelmed by higher tides—in
Miami Beach alone, the cost of improving stormwater infrastructure
to handle higher sea level is roughly $200 million.20
Legal risks include:
• Over-allocated resources. The most notable example is the Colorado River, which supplies water to more than 35 million Americans. A 2012 study by the Bureau of Reclamation projects that
over the next fifty years, future average flow of the river will be
far below the total allocated rights.21 Climate change exacerbates this risk, as it is projected to significantly diminish
snowpack and rainfall feeding river systems. In an over-allocated system, the standing of a water right is a vital metric of
risk, as junior and senior rights holders will be disproportionately affected by physical water shortages.
• Exposure to endangered species findings. The Endangered Species Act can be used to limit water diversion in order to protect
non-human species dependent on the same water resource. Protection of endangered species has resulted in significant reductions in permissible water withdrawals for major metropolitan
areas, including Southern California, which has been denied delivery of as much as 800,000 acre-feet of water per year due to
the endangered Delta smelt,22 and in San Antonio, where pumping from the Edwards Aquifer has been dramatically reduced
since the 1990s due to impacts on endangered fish and salamander species.

IV. DEMAND RISKS
Demand risk is the economic consequence of water demand failing
to meet projected estimates. Demand may fall short of projections for
any number of reasons including:
• Economic growth or population gains falling short of projections,
• Passive efficiencies, meaning a reduction in per capita usage due
to uptake of high-efficiency appliances or behavior changes that
were the result of forces exogenous to the water provider, or
• Active efficiencies, meaning a reduction in per capita usage due
to uptake of high-efficiency appliances or reductions in outdoor
water use that were influenced by the water provider through
20. Curtis Morgan, Rising sea comes at a cost for South Florida cities, THE MIAMI
HERALD (Sept. 1, 2012), available at http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/09/01/298038
8/rising-sea-come-at-a-cost-for.html.
21. SEC’Y SALAZAR RELEASES COLORADO RIVER BASIN STUDY PROJECTING MAJOR IMBALANCES IN WATER SUPPLY AND DEMAND, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR,
BUREAU OF RECLAMATION (Dec. 12, 2012), available at http://www.usbr.gov/newsroom/newsrelease/detail.cfm?RecordID=41645.
22. Paul C. Barton, House Passes Bill Taking Aim at Tiny California Fish,
NEWS10.NET (Feb. 29, 2012, 4:16 PM), http://origin.news10.net/news/article/181409/2/
House-passes-bill-taking-aim-at-tiny-California-fish.
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appliance rebate programs, water pricing structures, or outdoor
watering limits.

As appliance standards have increased consumer efficiency across
the country over the past four decades, household water use has fallen
everywhere, by tens of thousands of gallons per household annually in
Louisville, Kentucky to nearly 100,000 gallons per Las Vegas household (this terrific reduction is the combined effect of passive efficiency
gains and conservation programs by Southern Nevada Water Authority).23 Despite this widespread demand decline, many systems continue to forecast future demand assuming that per capita use will
remain fixed. In a sector whose revenue is largely driven by volumetric sales, the risk that demand may not meet future estimates is fundamentally revenue risk. Declining demand, without compensatory rate
increases, reduces anticipated revenues while doing little to reduce
fixed costs such as human labor, maintenance and debt service. Indeed, it is not atypical for a water system to have 80% of its costs fixed
but 80% of its revenue variable and based on volumetric sales.24
The relationship between water price and demand further complicates demand forecasts for water providers. Demand for water is
price-dependent, although the sensitivity of customers to price depends on many factors, including customer class (i.e. industrial vs. residential) and income. For many years, water was considered to be a
perfectly inelastic good, meaning that demand was independent of
price. In part this theory was buoyed by observations of customer
response to changes from extraordinarily low baseline prices (a few
tenths of a cent per gallon), which with even a doubling in price could
make the difference virtually imperceptible to a middle-class customer. Yet in recent years as water rates have risen, and as most
water utilities have transitioned away from flat fees to metered pricing, there is evidence that water prices may be entering a range in
which customers will be increasingly sensitive to price increases.25
Yet few utilities factor demand response to pricing in their demand
forecasts, and many systems do not estimate the sensitivity of customers to price when setting rates or estimating revenues.

23. See generally Rockaway, supra note 12.
24. See Jeff Hughes, Pricing and Revenues: A Challenging Relationship, U. OF N.C.
ENVTL. FIN. (Aug. 23, 2012), available at http://efc.web.unc.edu/2012/08/23/pricingand-revenues-a-challenging-relationship/.
25. Janice A. Beecher & Thomas W. Chesnutt, Declining Water Sales and Utility
Revenues: A Framework for Understanding and Adapting, ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY 4 (Aug. 29–30, 2012), http://www.allianceforwaterefficiency.org/uploaded
Files/Resource_Center/Library/rates/Summit-Summary-and-Declining-Water-Salesand-Utility-Revenues-2012-12-16.pdf.
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V. GOVERNANCE
The governance of public water systems poses its own risks to
timely cost recovery and long-term affordability of water services.
Unlike electricity prices, which typically are set by state-level public
utility commissions (“PUC”), most water systems depend on city
councils or water boards whose membership is elected or appointed
by elected officials to set prices. As a result, the process of water rate
setting is highly politicized.
Governance by individuals who are answerable to voters can lead to
management myopically focused on minimizing water rate increases.
As a result, too many water providers deliver services at rates below
the actual cost of service, a math that works out through persistent
deficit financing and under-budgeting for asset replacement. It is not
at all uncommon for a water system to replace its buried assets (pipes)
at such an incremental pace that complete replacement would only be
achieved once every 300 years—Washington, DC is one city that
struggled to revise rates to improve this absurdly protracted
schedule.26
Some states have sought to reduce the political nature of water utility rate setting—for example, Wisconsin is the only state that requires
both investor-owned public water utilities to file rate adjustments with
state public utility commissions, and Indiana permits public water systems to opt into state-level regulation at the PUC. Short of moving
the forum for rate setting, the onus is on water managers to anticipate
politics and articulate the imperative for investment in language responsive to the values and needs of political constituents.
On top of this political challenge is the fundamental problem of
misaligned planning horizons endemic to the sector. Prices (rates) are
reassessed in many places annually (if that frequently). Water managers may present boards or city councils with forecasts of five-year rate
changes, but rarely do they look beyond that window. Capital decisions, including supply projects, are identified and prioritized based on
planning horizons of up to fifty years, and debt financing over some
thirty to forty years. Yet rarely do utility managers and finance directors looking over these multi-decade horizons communicate the rate
effects of supply decisions over the long-term to city council members—and even if they did, city council members responsive to nearterm election needs may be lacking motivation to take steps today
that may increase near-term costs to their customers in favor of longterm affordability.
Water conservation falls subject to this near-term/long-term mismatch in incentives. On the one hand, conservation helps assure future supply and can defer or even obviate the need for new capital26. DC Water Chief: Right Place, Right Time, 1 WATER INTELLIGENCE 22 (Dec.
2010), http://www.dcwater.com/news/pdfs/AWI_Hawkins.pdf.
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intensive infrastructure—reservoirs, pipelines, and treatment plants—
to bring new supplies to market. On the other hand, under a business
model in which debt obligations are repaid with revenue highly dependent on volumetric sales, and in which most costs are fixed, the
revenue forgone in reduced sales must be made up for through higher
fixed charges, or higher unit costs, concepts that can inflame voters
and create political risk for elected officials.
VI. ROLE

OF

MARKETS

Although these risks are already driving credit degradation across
the sector, investors do not adequately assess the supply, demand and
rate risk factors described above. The credit metrics and disclosure
standards in the water sector are artifacts of the decades through
which water systems maintained some of the lowest credit default
rates of municipal issuers. Yet as the economic downturn has precipitated credit downgrades well in excess of sector averages,27 it has also
underscored the need for improved credit assessment even among essential services providers. In doing so, the markets can also play a
more effective role in driving better governance and improved water
management.
Institutional investors seek metrics that will allow them to readily
compare systems against each other and against sector benchmarks.
For this reason, they focus on characteristics that are easy to measure,
and that are readily available for many systems. The metrics that
water systems report are defined by credit rating agency methodologies and by the disclosure guidance of bond market professional associations, although institutional investors may seek out additional
metrics for their own proprietary credit assessment approaches.
Credit assessment metrics define how investors assess water systems,
but they also determine the information that water systems give to the
market. And because credit ratings and investor pricing decisions dictate the cost of capital paid by water systems when they go to market—a cost water systems seek to minimize—these metrics can also
drive water management decisions.
The credit assessment process faces two problems: first, investors
may not be measuring what matters, and second, the focus on shortterm metrics may incentivize water managers to manage to short-term
financial performance at the expense of long-term supply reliability
and rate affordability.
Alongside the near-term financial ratios used by investors to assess
credit health, investors also evaluate operational characteristics to uncover any looming capital expenditures that may sizably increase debt
load. These operational characteristics include the water systems’
27. REPUCCI & BARBERIO, FITCH RATINGS, U.S. PUBLIC FIN. RATING ACTIONS
2011 1 (2012).
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treatment and storage capacity compared to daily maximum demand
and failure to comply environmental regulations such as drinking
water or surface water quality standards that may precipitate investment in treatment facilities. While growth needs and regulatory compliance certainly pose costs to water systems, supply and demand risks
have equivalent potential to undermine systems’ credit health; credit
metrics barely touch on these factors. For example, bond buyers do
not seek, nor do water systems provide, information on the seniority
of water rights even in over-allocated water basins. Bond buyers do
not seek out information on the storage capacity of groundwater supplies despite their precipitous decline in many regions. With respect
to demand risk, bond buyers ask water systems to provide historical
and future estimates of population and economic growth as a way of
estimating future water demand, but not per capita demand trends or
price sensitivity analysis.28
How water systems behave during drought provides an instructive
window into the perverse ways in which credit ratings can influence
water management decisions. At the heart of the issue is the highly
variable revenue water systems depend upon to meet largely fixed
costs—revenue that primarily flows from the residential sector29 and
in the southeast and arid west 50-70% of which comes from outdoor
watering.30 Because water systems in the southeast and west are so
dependent on outdoor watering for revenues, they may have little financial incentive to discourage usage during drought and often do so
only when brought to the edge of supply failure. Midland, Texas offers a classic example: in 2012, once two of its three reservoirs had run
completely dry and the third was severely compromised, the town finally took steps to reduce residential use. The drop in sales triggered
a credit downgrade of the water system, and in January of 2013, Midland lifted the higher rates for high volume users it had imposed just
months earlier to discourage excessive water use—the most likely reason for the about-face, restoration of the utility’s credit ratios to enable further borrowing. With the Panhandle seeing little recovery
from the drought of 2011, it remains to be seen whether Midland simply bought itself a short-term credit fix at the cost of irrevocably compromising its surface supplies.
In response to credit degradation spurred by the economic downturn and by growing awareness of water supply risks, institutional investors are beginning to develop tools to enable their own water risk
assessment. Tools range from map-based risk models such as
28. See National Federation of Municipal Analysts, Recommended Best Practices in
Disclosure for Water and Sewer Transactions, NAT’L FED’N OF MUN. ANALYSIS (Mar.
2006), http://www.nfma.org/assets/documents/DG.BP.rbp_water_sewer.doc.pdf.
29. See 2006 Community Water System Survey, supra note 7, at 20.
30. Research Report on Turfgrass Allowance, EPA WATERSENSE at 2, EPA.GOV
(Dec. 9, 2009), http://www.epa.gov/WaterSense/docs/home_turfgrass-report508.pdf.
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Aqueduct, a project of World Resources Institute, to corporate risk
assessment tools such as Aqua Gauge, a project of Ceres. The ability
of investors to shape their own view of water risks is an important
factor in a market that efficiently communicates risk through pricing.
But for water systems seen as having outsized risk, the outcome can
be sobering. Already, some investors predicate buy decisions on
water availability, and in some cases simply do not buy in regions
where the risk is viewed as being excessive or uncompensated. Recent
regulatory filings by insurance companies—large investors in municipal bonds—describe such geographic screens.31
Theoretically, assessment by investors could provide an important
feedback signal to water managers participating in the market, and
financial incentive to attain a better level of practice. But it is also
possible that pricing signals sent through the bond market could unintentionally drive unsustainable water management practices if those
practices enhance short-term financial metrics, or could send inappropriate pricing signals to systems with strong management practices
and comparatively low water risk if the mode of measurement is inappropriately designed. Geographic screens that do not consider placebased practice, such as long-range planning, demand management,
and cost recovery could raise the cost of capital for entire states or
regions and disadvantage well-managed systems that happen to be in
that region.
In this environment, it is all the more important that risk assessments are designed to measure the metrics that matter, and reward
sustainable water management no matter where the water is being
used.
Disclosure is a tool that water systems can use to manage their own
market risk—by providing superior information, systems can counteract investor bias and position themselves to perform well in investorrisk analysis. But developing and propagating disclosure expectations
within the municipal bond market is challenging given the nature of
securities regulation. Municipal entities are not regulated directly by
the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), as the 1975 Tower
Amendment to the Securities Exchange Act restricts the ability of the
SEC and Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (“MSRB”) to set
disclosure expectations or filing requirements for municipal issuers.32
As a result, regulators’ disclosure guidance such as the SEC’s disclosure guidance for publicly-traded corporations clarifying expectations
31. See Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, Insurer Climate Risk Disclosure
Survey Questions, CAL. DEP’T OF INS., CLIMATE RISK SURVEY SEARCH DATABASE
(2011); see also The Traveler’s Group, 2011 Insurer Climate Risk Disclosure Survey
Questions, CAL. DEP’T OF INS., CLIMATE RISK SURVEY SEARCH DATABASE (updated
Feb. 2012).
32. Andrew Ackerman, SEC Looks to Target Tower Amendment, THE BOND
BUYER, BONDBUYER.COM (May 13, 2009), http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/118_91/303354-1.html.
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for disclosure of material risks related to climate change, including
water stress and scarcity,33 has limited reach with respect to public
water providers. However, municipal advisors, including bond underwriters, are regulated by the SEC, and may be subject to disclosure
guidance.
Yet beyond the idiosyncrasies of regulatory oversight in the municipal market, the reality is that meaningful disclosure for water and
sewer entities beyond basic financial statements is distinct from meaningful disclosure for other municipal issuers—the credit factors affecting water providers are materially different from public hospitals,
school districts, and general obligations issuers. In this regard, the
SEC’s recommendations for improving fairness and efficiency of the
municipal market through development of best practices is realistically the most effective way of developing disclosure standards with
the greatest relevance to the water sector:
Municipal market participants should follow and should encourage
others to follow existing industry best practices and expand and develop additional best practices guidelines in a number of areas to
enhance disclosures and disclosure practices in the municipal securities market.34

To assist the water sector in perfecting disclosure practices, the Boston-based sustainability advocacy group, Ceres, working with some
the nation’s largest water systems and members of its Investor Network on Climate Risk, a group of 100 investors with $11 trillion under
management, has developed a disclosure framework for water and
sewer utilities that gets to the root of the changes affecting the water
sector today. The framework, which was released in February 2013,
has already been employed by Cascade Water Alliance, a regional
wholesale water supplier near Seattle, in development of the Official
Statement associated with its December 2012 bond issuance. The objective is for investors to use this disclosure framework as a best practice in disclosure, and incorporate the factors in the framework into
credit assessment and dialogue with utility management and their financial representatives including underwriters. Uptake of this disclosure framework depends on cooperation from water systems along
with their financial advisors and bond counsel, who may resist adoption on the pretext of increased compliance costs for continued disclosure in the secondary market (investor-to-investor transactions). Yet
this resistance could be offset if issuers with superior disclosure practices are rewarded in the market by a lower cost of capital.
33. See COMMISSION GUIDANCE REGARDING DISCLOSURE RELATED TO CLIMATE
CHANGE, 17 CFR PARTS 211, 231 & 241, RELEASE NO. 33-9106; 34-61469; FR-82,
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Feb. 8, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2010/33-9106.
pdf.
34. See REPORT ON MUNICIPAL SECURITIES MARKET, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N
(July 31, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/munireport073112.pdf.
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For the market to truly reflect the business strength of a water enterprise, sellers will need to make available better information, and
buyers will need to make use of this information. Good disclosure is
not enough—the use of disclosure by investors is also necessary. Investment indices with selective eligibility criteria based upon management practice, and other investment products that better measure the
resilience of water systems’ business models and governance of these
systems are much needed in the municipal market. Such products exist to some extent for corporate securities—one example is the ECPI
Global Blue Gold Equity Index, which is limited to firms active in
water-related businesses (e.g. water treatment, infrastructure, distribution) and further subject to a proprietary Environmental Social
Governance (“ESG”) screen that selects companies based on their environmental score and endorsement of the CEO Water Mandate. Inclusion in such indices is often viewed as a boon to corporate
management, as widely used indices create a readymade market for
share trading which can result in higher share value.
Conceptually, there is no reason why an index for municipal water
systems could not be structured to help investors identify systems with
superior management practices. Hopefully, the turbulence created by
credit degradation in the market will spur investors to develop such
products, which can better aid investors in anticipating and pricing
risk, and create a virtuous circle in the market by communicating beneficial price signals to systems that are operating as 21st century water
enterprises.
VII. CONCLUSION
The operating environment for water utilities is changing in ways
that can undermine the reliability and affordability of this essential
service. For investors and water systems this changing reality requires
new ways to evaluate risk. This also invites a new era of innovation
for both the water utility business model and investment tools to finance water needs and evaluate water investments.
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